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Abstract 
 
Purpose –This study investigates the role of financial access in moderating the effect of 
governance on insurance consumption in 42 Sub-Saharan African countries using data for the 
period 2004-2014. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Two life insurance indicators are used, notably: life 
insurance and non-life insurance. Six governance measurements are also used, namely: 
political stability, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, 
corruption-control and the rule of law. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) and Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDVC) 
estimators. 
 
Findings –Estimations from the LSDVC are not significant while the following main findings 
are established from the GMM. First, financial access promotes life insurance through 
channels of political stability, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, the rule of 
law and corruption-control. Second, financial access also stimulates non-life insurance via 
governance mechanisms of political stability, “voice & accountability”, government 
effectiveness, regulation quality, the rule of law and corruption-control.  
 
Originality/value – This research complements the sparse literature on insurance promotion 
in Africa by engaging the hitherto unexplored role of financial access through governance 
channels.  
 
JEL Classification: I28; I30; G20; O16; O55 
Keywords: Insurance; Finance; Governance; Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
1. Introduction 
The insurance market is relevant for economic development because insurers provide leverage 
that can be used to hedge against negative macroeconomic shocks which substantially slow 
down economic activities. Hence, by offering financial protection to all segments of society 
involved in household and economic activities, uncertainty linked to the macroeconomic 
environment is reduced, and a favourable environment for doing business is provided because 
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investors prefer macroeconomic environments that are less ambiguous (Kelsey & le Roux, 
2017, 2018). Against this background on the importance of insurance in economic 
development, the positioning of this research on the role of financial access is moderating the 
effect of governance on insurance market development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is 
motivated by three main factors in scholarly literature and policy-making circles, namely: the 
relatively low consumption of insurance in the sub-region; the importance of financial access 
in development outcomes and gaps in the attendant literature.  These motivational factors are 
expanded in the following passages in the same chronology as they are highlighted.  
 First, in relation to other regions of the world that are more developed and associated 
with higher levels of insurance penetration, SSA is characterised by one of the lowest levels 
of insurance penetration in the world. As maintained by Kyerematen (2015), in the sub-
region, with the exception of South Africa, only about 5% of the population subscribes to 
insurance services. Moreover, according to the narrative, a number of factors account for such 
low penetration of insurance in the sub-region, inter alia: the absence of infrastructure, poor 
doing business climate and low levels of financial access. This research, which is partly 
motivated by this strand, assesses the relevance of financial access is moderating the effect of 
governance on insurance penetration.  
 Second, financial development is fundamental in Africa’s recent economic growth 
resurgence essentially because, inter alia, access to finance improves investment 
opportunities for corporations and households as well as living standards and economic 
development.  The theoretical and empirical literature supporting this consensus include 
studies by Odhiambo (2010, 2013, 2014); Wale and Makina (2017); Iyke and Odhiambo 
(2017); Tchamyou (2019a, 2019b), and Tchamyou, Erreygers and Cassimon (2019). While 
financial development has also been recently documented to promote insurance penetration in 
Africa (Zerriaa, Amiri, Noubbigh & Naoui, 2017), the evidence is limited to a selected 
country (i.e. Tunisia) and a channel by which financial access influences insurance 
development is not engaged. This research focuses on a sample of countries in SSA and 
engages the governance channel as a mechanism by which financial access affects insurance 
penetration. Hence, the research question this study seeks to answer is the following: how 
does financial access modulate the effect of governance on insurance penetration in SSA? The 
positioning of this research question is also motivated by an apparent gap in the literature. 
 Third, as expanded in section 2, contemporary research on the progress of the 
insurance market in Africa has fundamentally focused on two main branches of the literature, 
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notably: (i) nexuses between economic growth and insurance consumption and (ii) drivers of 
insurance development. Some studies in the former branch of the literature are: Ioncică, 
Petrescu, Ioncica and Constantinescu (2012); Akinlo (2015); Alhassan and Biekpe (2015, 
2016a); and Asongu and Odhiambo (2020). Moreover, researchers supporting the latter 
branch of literature include: Guerineau and Sawadogo, (2015); Alhassan and Biekpe (2016b); 
Zerriaa, Amiri, Noubbigh and Naoui (2017); and Asongu, Nnanna and Acha-anyi (2020). The 
second branch of the literature is closer to the positioning of this research. Furthermore, the 
departure of this research in the light of the attendant literature has been engaged in the 
previous paragraph.  Accordingly, in departing from Zerriaa et al. (2017), the use of the 
governance channel in this study is motivated by the documented relevance of  good 
governance in promoting a conducive environment for investment, economic prosperity and 
private sector development in Africa (Efobi, 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b).  
 The remainder of the research is structured as follows: The intuition motivating the 
study and the highlighted insurance literature in the introduction are expanded in section 2, 
while the data and methodology are covered in section 3. The empirical results and the 
corresponding discussion are disclosed in section 4. Section 5 concludes with implications 
and future research directions.  
 
2. Intuition, theoretical insights and Insurance in Africa 
Two main sub-sections are covered in this section. The first engages the intuition and 
theory underpinning an investigation into linkages between financial access, governance and 
insurance development while the second expands the insurance-centric literature highlighted 
in the introduction.  
 
2.1 Intuition and theoretical insights  
2.1.1 Intuition  
In the primary strand, authors of this study are fully aware of the risks associated with 
an empirical exercise that is not consolidated with established theoretical underpinnings. 
However, the authors also argue that applied economics is a useful scientific activity, 
essentially because applied econometrics is not exclusively designed for the acceptance and 
rejection of established theoretical underpinnings. Within this framework, it can reasonably be 
argued that applied economics that is consolidated by sound intuition is not a useless 
scientific endeavour. This is essentially because it could pave the way to theory-building. In a 
nutshell, the arguments above are supported by a recent strand of applied econometrics 
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literature which maintains the usefulness of empirical exercises based on sound intuition 
(Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan, Mishra & Narayan, 2011). The following passages 
discuss the intuition underlying nexuses between financial access, governance and insurance 
penetration. 
Financial development is indispensable in building the insurance sector because 
insurance promotes economic prosperity, inter alia, by mobilising financial resources by 
means of insurance premia. Hence, the insurance sector also plays the role of financial 
intermediation within an economy because mobilized funds from the sector are ultimately 
invested in government securities and stock markets. Moreover, the mobilised funds are 
subsequently used to generate employment owing to their allocation to industrial development 
and productive investments. In summary, the insurance sector avails opportunities for the 
reduction of risks, growth of trade and consolidation of financial stability which are critical 
factors in the promotion of economic prosperity and sustainable economic development 
(Kumari, 2016). The role of the insurance sector in stabilising the economy and promoting 
macroeconomic certainty is not different from the role governance plays in promoting 
investment and economic development in a country. 
Good governance is necessary for sustainable development because dynamics of 
governance are associated with various advantages and disadvantages that can: (i) either 
increase or decrease avenues of risk mitigation and (ii) provide people and investors with a 
stable macroeconomic environment that reduces the negative ramifications of macroeconomic 
shocks on economic activities and household welfare.  In essence, the importance of good 
governance in putting in place appropriate policies that are favourable to the mobilisation and 
transformation of aggregate domestic capital into long term investment is consistent with the 
fundamental missions of the financial and insurance sectors. Hence: the intuitive connection 
between governance, financial development and insurance development. The channel of 
governance as a mechanism by which financial access affects the development of the 
insurance sector can be better articulated by conceptually clarifying the good governance 
measurements. Hence, governance (political, economic and institutional) provides favourable 
avenues for the development of the insurance sector because policy makers in the governance 
sectors are motivated by the rewards of insurance penetration in economic prosperity.    
In the light of the above background, the conceptions and definitions of the underlying 
governance dynamics are in accordance with contemporary literature:  “The first concept is 
about the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (Political 
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Governance): voice and accountability and political stability. The second has to do with the 
capacity of government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services 
(Economic Governance): regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The last, but by no 
means least, regards the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the 
interactions among them (Institutional Governance): the rule of law and control of 
corruption” (Andres, Asongu & Amavilah, 2015, p. 1041). 
 
2.1.2 Theoretical insights  
Consistent with Iyawe and Osamwonyi (2017), there are well documented theoretical 
underpinnings linking economic activities and insurance sector development. Two of these 
are discussed in accordance with the authors, namely: (i) the Conventional Expected Utility 
Theory and (ii) the Cumulative Prospective Theory. According to the narrative, insurance is 
essential in developing countries such as Africa because of a plethora of associated 
development externalities.  
 
Conventional Expected Utility Theory (CEUT) 
From the simplest perspective, CEUT supposes that the utility of a consumer, U, is a function 
is disposable income, Y (Iyawe & Osamwonyi, 2017). From a health insurance perspective, a 
probability, p, exists that a consumer who can fall ill can allocate L expenditure to medical 
care. Otherwise, the consumer could also buy full insurance coverage pertaining to the 
actuarially fair premium of P = pL, for which a payoff transfer I will be received by the 
consumer, if he/she is ill. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that L=I. Hence, the 
expected utility without insurance is: 
)()()1( LYUYUpEU pu     (1) 
 
With insurance, expected utility is: 
 
)()()()1( YPUIPYLUYPUpEU pi                                      (2) 
 
On the premise that there is a diminishing marginal income utility, the situation of the 
consumer is better if he/she avoids the risk of loss, L, by paying P for the insurance. It follows 
that the customer who is maximising expected-utility would buy insurance coverage for these 
underlying expenditure if EUi>EUu, or if 
 
)()()1()( LYUYUpPYU p                                      (3) 
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In the light of the way the theory is mathematically specified, the choice between 
uncertainty and certainty of losses that are actuarially-equivalent is apparent. The choice 
pertaining to the purchase of insurance is linked with both a higher level of anticipated utility 
and certainty.  Therefore, as documented by Nyman (2001), the demand for insurance is 
essentially motivated by the certainty associated with insurance subscriptions. Moreover, the 
underlying expected utility can be consolidated by factors that are favourable to insurance as 
those discussed in the intuition section of this study, inter alia: financial development and 
favourable governance and institutions.  
 
Cumulative Prospective Theory (CPT) 
The theory of choice which is also known as the prospect theory posits that from a particular 
point of reference, the value realised by individuals from income gains increases with gain in 
size, though at a diminishing rate (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1990, 1992). In the same vein, the 
value lost by individuals from income losses increases with the importance of loss at a 
decreasing rate.  
The CPT supposes that a risk-oriented behaviour on losses is displayed by investors 
who are willing toaccept risks in view of achieving their investment goals. Such behaviour 
has been established in a multitude of experimental studies (Iyawe & Osamwonyi, 2017). 
Accordingly, risk-taking behaviour of managers of funds is associated with incentives of 
contracts (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017a). Moreover, Dass, Massa, and Patgiri (2008) have 
concluded that managers of funds characterised by high contractual incentives are associated 
with strategies that involve riskier investments. The nexuses between insurance consumption 
and conditions favourable to such insurance penetration (e.g. financial development and good 
governance as is in the context of this study) surrounding the CEUT are broadly consistent 
with the CPT.   
 
2.2 Insurance sector development  
In the secondary strand, this research devotes space to expanding on the highlighted 
literature in the introduction, which has been documented in two main categories, notably: 
determinants of the development of the insurance market (Guerineau & Sawadogo, 2015; 
Alhassan & Biekpe, 2016b; Zerriaa et al., 2017) and linkages between insurance penetration 
and economic prosperity (Ioncică et al., 2012; Akinlo, 2015; Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015, 
2016a).  These stands are developed in the same chronology as they are highlighted.  
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In the category on determinants of insurance penetration, Guerineau and Sawadogo 
(2015) have examined twenty countries using data from 1996 to 2011. The authors have 
concluded using an endogeneity-robust empirical approach that a positive relationship 
between per capita income and the consumption of life insurance is apparent. Moreover, life 
insurance penetration is linked with young dependency ratio and life expectancy whereas 
factors that are positively associated with the phenomenon include: property rights, 
government stability and old dependency ratio. Zerriaa et al. (2017) have focused on the 
selected country (i.e. Tunisia) to investigate drivers of life insurance using data for the period 
1990-2014 to conclude that rates of interest and inflation do not significantly promote the 
outcome variable. They also maintain that the consumption of life insurance is mitigated by 
pension expenditure while it is promoted by dependency, financial development, income, life 
expectancy and urbanisation. Alhassan and Biekpe (2016b) within this same category of the 
literature have assessed factors that stimulate life insurance in 31 African countries with data 
for the period 1996-2010.  The results of the study show that relative to financial factors, 
demographic drivers more significantly elicit the outcome variable. Furthermore, life 
insurance is not stimulated by inflation, dependency and life expectancy while positive 
impacts are induced from institutional quality, health expenditure, insurance consumption and 
financial development.    
In the second category of the insurance-centric literature, Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) 
investigate connections between efficiency, productivity and returns to scale economies in the 
non-life insurance market of the most developed insurance sector in Africa (South Africa) 
using data for the period 2007-2012. Corresponding results show that about 20% of insurers 
carry-out their tasks with optimality whereas about 50% inefficiency is associated with non-
life insurance operations. The related findings demonstrate that improvements in productivity 
are contingent on technological ameliorations as well as non-monotonic effects from constant 
returns to scale and size. In another study, using data for the period 1990-2010, Alhassan and 
Biekpe (2016a) examine the nexuses between insurance penetration and economic 
development in selected African countries, namely:  Algeria, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. The results from an autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) approach show that long term connections between insurance penetration and 
economic growth are apparent in Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. As 
for the findings from the vector error correction model (VECM): Gabon shows mixed 
causality, Morocco reflects bi-directional causality while unidirectional causality is apparent 
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in Madagascar and Algeria. Akinlo (2015) within this category of the literature has examined 
causal linkages between economic development and insurance in 33 countries in SSA using 
data from 1995 to 2011.  The findings based on an estimation approach that controls for 
heterogeneity show evidence of bidirectional causality between insurance development and 
economic prosperity.   
Within this second category of the extant literature, there is also a substantial body of 
non-African-centric literature that has focused on the nexus between insurance consumption 
and income levels. Hugues, Mota, Nunez, Sehgal and Ortega (2019) assess the impact of 
income and insurance on the probability of leg amputation to establish that across different 
types of insurance, there was a substantial reduction in odd rations linked to amputation.  
Levere, Orzol,  Leininger and Early  (2019) are concerned with the long-term and 
contemporaneous impacts of the expansion of children’s public health insurance on 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation to conclude that: (i) enhanced eligibility to 
Medicaid decreases the participation on children’s SSI in states that are not characterised by 
automatic grants associated with SSI and (ii) in the long term, increased eligibility to 
Medicaid during childhood decrease the SSI participation of young adults to a certain degree.  
Finkelstein, Hendrenand Shepard (2019) investigate how much individuals with low income 
are willing to pay to obtained health insurance as well as the corresponding implications for 
the development of the insurance market. The authors estimate that even with generous 
subsidies, take-up will be substantially incomplete. Teusner, Brennan and Spencer (2015) 
have analysed nexuses between favourable dental visiting according to household income and 
the level of cover in private dental insurance. They conclude that whereas the height of cover 
was not linked to dental visiting, the results, however, showed that insurance could ameliorate 
orientation of and access to dental care for adults in lower socioeconomic status and engender 
less effect on access patterns for adults with higher socioeconomic status.  Sackey and 
Amponsah (2017) examine if income levels matter in the willingness to accept capitation 
payment system within the framework of Ghana’s National Health Insurance Policy. The 
findings, inter alia: show that within an individual setting, the following are significant 
factors: high income, awareness, employment and smaller household size.  
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
This research focuses on 42 countries in SSA using data from 2004 to 20142. The motivation 
for the selection of sampled countries is contingent on constraints in the availability of data at 
the time of the study. The variables used in the empirical analysis are obtained from three 
main sources, namely: (i) World Governance Indicators of the World Bank for the governance 
variables (political stability, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation 
quality, corruption-control and the rule of law); (ii) the Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD) of the World Bank for the insurance dynamics (life insurance and non-life 
insurance) and  the financial access variable (private domestic credit); (iii) the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank for the control variables (mobile phone 
penetration and remittances).  
 The governance variables which have been conceptually clarified in section 2 are 
motivated by contemporary African governance literature (Andrés et al., 2015; Oluwatobi, 
Efobi, Olurinola, Alege, 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b) while the adopted insurance 
variables are also consistent  with the insurance-centric literature highlighted in the 
introduction and critically engaged in section 2 (Ioncică et al., 2012; Guerineau & Sawadogo, 
2015; Akinlo, 2015; Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Zerriaa et al., 2017). Moreover, 
it is worthwhile to emphasise that this research uses all the insurance indicators provided by 
the FDSD of the World Bank.  The credit channel as a measurement of financial access is 
preferred to the deposit channel because credit availment is intuitively more associated with 
financial access, given that deposits are only a measure of financial depth and can only 
promote access to finance when transformed into credit for economic operators.  
 The selection of variables in the conditioning information set (i.e. remittances and 
mobile phone penetration) is motivated by the discussed literature on determinants of 
insurance penetration. On the one hand, the burgeoning information technology is facilitating 
the expansion of the insurance market in Africa. On the other, remittances have been 
documented to be largely used for consumption purposes (including insurance consumption) 
                                                          
2 The 42 countries include: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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by Ssozi and Asongu (2016). Hence the expected signs from the two control variables are 
positive. 
 It is also worthwhile to emphasise that only two control variables are adopted in the 
conditioning information set for the purpose of avoiding concerns pertaining to instrument 
proliferation that can considerably bias estimated coefficients owing to the invalidity of 
corresponding estimated models. In essence, the purpose of limiting control variables in order 
to ensure the validity of estimated models (even when instruments are collapsed in the 
estimation exercise) is consistent the attendant empirical literature based on the generalised 
method of moments (GMM).  An example of a study that has used two control variables is 
Bruno, De Bonis and Silvestrini (2012). Moreover, there are also GMM-centric studies in the 
literature that are based on no control variable, notably: Osabuohien and Efobi (2013). 
Appendix 1 provides the definitions and sources of variables while Appendix 1 discloses the 
summary statistics. The correlation matrix is provided in Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 GMM Specification 
Drawing on the narrative in the data section, the GMM empirical strategy is adopted for this 
study. The empirical approach is also based on four main justifications which are consistent 
with the relevant GMM-centric literature (Efobi, Tanaken & Asongu, 2018; Fosu & Abass, 
2019). (i) In accordance with the attendant literature, an elementary condition for the 
employment of the estimation technique is that the number of cross sections should exceed 
the number of time periods within each cross section. Such is the case with the data structure 
of this research because the study is dealing with 42 countries with data spanning 11 years 
(i.e. 2004 to 2014) in each country. (ii) Persistence is reflected in the adopted insurance 
indicators because of apparent correlation coefficients (i.e. between level and first lags) that 
are higher than 0.800 which is the established rule of thumb for confirming the presence of 
persistence in the literature (Meniago & Asongu, 2018; Tchamyou et al., 2019).  Accordingly, 
the corresponding correlations are respectively, 0.975 and 0.992 for non-life insurance and 
life insurance. (iii) Given that the data structure of the research is panel, it is obvious that 
cross-country variations are taken onboard in the estimation exercises. (iv) Issues pertaining 
to endogeneity are also considered and addressed on two main fronts. On the one hand, 
reverse causality or simultaneity is tackled with the use of internal instruments in the 
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estimation process. On the other, the unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for by controlling 
for time-invariant omitted variables.  
            In the light of available GMM options (i.e. difference versus system estimators) in the 
empirical literature, this research follows the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) improvement of 
Arellano and Bond (1995) which has been established in contemporary development literature 
to produce more efficient estimates and restrict the proliferation of instruments (Tchamyou et 
al., 2019). 
The following equations in level (4) and first difference (5) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
tititititititititi RMCGGCII ,,6,5,4,3,2,10,    
               
(4) 
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



tititttitititi
titititititititititi
RRMM
CGCGGGCCIIII
            
(5) 
 
where, tiI , reflects an insurance indicator (i.e. life insurance and non-life insurance) of country 
i in period t , 0 is a constant. C is credit access of country i in  period t .   G is a governance 
dynamic (encompassing political stability, “voice & accountability”, regulation quality, 
government effectiveness, corruption-control and the rule of law) of  country i in  period t .
CG reflects interactions between credit access  and governance indicators(“credit access” × 
“political stability”; “credit access” × “voice & accountability”; “credit access”× “regulation 
quality”; “credit access” × “government effectiveness”; “credit access” × “corruption control” 
and “credit access”× “the rule of law ”). M is mobile phone penetration of country i in  
period t .  R denotes remittances of country i in  period t .  represents the lagged value  
which is one within the framework of this study because a year lag is enough to capture past 
information, t is the time-specific constant, i
 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error 
term3.  
             The interaction term is used to capture the conditional impact or associated effect 
from financial access and governance. This is consistent with the problem statement of the 
                                                          
3
 The variables enter the GMM estimations in level, lag, orthogonal formats, inter alia, and transformation in the GMM is 
done automatically with the Roodman command during the estimation process. For instance the following is the first 
specification of Table 1: “xtabond2     inslife  l.inslife  pols  pcrdbof  polfin  mobilephone  remit   yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 
yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11, gmm(l.inslife l(0/1).pols  l(0/1).pcrdbof  l(0/1).polfin  l(0/1). mobilephone   l(0/1).remit, collapse lag(1 1)) 
iv(yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11, eq(diff)) twostep small orthog” where, xtabond2 is the Roodman (2009a, 
2009b) Stata command, inslife is life insurance, l.inlife is the lag of life insurance, pols is political stability, pcrdbof is private 
domestic credit, polfin is the interaction between political stability and private domestic credit, mobile is mobile phone 
penetration, remit is remittances, yr1 yr2....yr11 denote year dummies, inter alia. 
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study which is to assess the role of financial access in moderating the effect of governance on 
insurance consumption. Hence, the estimated interaction term captures the conditional role of 
financial access in moderating governance for insurance penetration. 
 
3.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 
Still in accordance with contemporary GMM literature, clarifying concerns pertaining to 
identification and exclusion restrictions is particularly relevant for a robust GMM 
specification (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017b). Going by the literature, years are acknowledged 
as strictly exogenous whereas elements in the conditioning information set (i.e. control 
variables) and the independent variables of interest (i.e. governance and credit access 
variables) are acknowledged as predetermined or endogenous-explaining (Tchamyou et al., 
2019).  This identification and exclusion restriction properties are consistent with Roodman 
(2009b) who has argued that the identified strictly exogenous variables (i.e. years) are not 
likely to be endogenous upon a first difference4.   
             The Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) is used to assess the assumption underlying the 
strategy of identification and corresponding exclusion restriction properties. Based on this 
criterion, the null hypothesis of the test should not be rejected in order for the identification 
process and exclusion restrictions assumptions to hold. This null hypothesis reflects the 
position that the identified strictly exogenous indicators affect insurance penetration 
exclusively via the predetermined variables. The procedure for validating exclusion 
restrictions is broadly consistent with the less contemporary instrumental variable (IV) 
approach in which a rejection of the null hypothesis corresponding to the Sargan/Hansen test, 
implies that the engaged instruments do not affect the outcome variables exclusively via the 
exogenous components of the identified predetermined variables (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Levine, 2003). 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
The empirical findings are presented in this section in Tables 1-2. Table 1 presents results on 
linkages between governance, financial access and life insurance while Table 2 shows 
findings on nexuses between governance, financial access and non-life insurance.  In each 
table, there are six main specifications pertaining to each governance channel, namely: 
                                                          
4Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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political stability, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, rule 
of law and corruption control (in this order). For all six specifications in both tables, four 
information criteria as employed to examine the validity of estimated models5.In the light of 
these criteria, all the estimated models are overwhelmingly valid.  
              In order to investigate the total influence of financial access on the relevance of good 
governance in promoting the consumption of life insurance and non-life insurance, net 
impacts are computed from the unconditional effect of government quality and the conditional 
effect from the interaction between government quality and financial access. This 
computation is consistent with contemporary literature based on interactive regressions 
(Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017b).  For the purpose of illustration and clarity, in the third column 
of Table 1, the net impact from the importance of financial access in modulating the effect of 
“voice & accountability” on life insurance is 0.031([-0.007 × 20.913] + [0.178]). In this 
calculation, the mean value of private domestic credit is 20.913; the unconditional impact of 
“voice & accountability” is 0.178 whereas the conditional impact from the interaction 
between private domestic credit and “voice & accountability” is -0.007.  
                As documented in Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) and in contemporary 
interactive regressions literature (Tchamyou, 2019b; Agoba, Abor, Osei & Sa-Aadu., 2019), 
the constituents of the interactive regressions should not be interpreted in isolation, but net 
effects should be computed based interactive and unconditional effects. The interactive effect 
is the conditional effect multiplied by the mean value of the moderating variable whereas the 
unconditional effect is the effect of the main independent variable of interest (i.e. 
governance). In this study, we are assessing the role of finance in modulating the effect of 
governance on insurance penetration. Hence, the unconditional effect should be associated 
with governance while the interactive effect is the conditional effect of governance multiplied 
by the mean value financial access or the moderating variable. 
            The following findings can be established from Tables 1-2. First, credit access 
promotes life insurance through channels of “voice & accountability”, government 
effectiveness, the rule of law and corruption-control. This is essentially because net effects are 
                                                          
5
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
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apparent from the attendant specifications. Second, access to credit also stimulates non-life 
insurance via governance mechanisms of political stability, regulation quality, government 
effectiveness and corruption-control. The significant control variables largely display the 
expected signs.  
Table 1: Governance, Financial Access and Life Insurance (GMM 1) 
       
 Dependent variable: Life Insurance (LifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
LifeI (-1) 0.953*** 0.858*** 0.781*** 0.938*** 0.868*** 0.758*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) -0.0001 0.005* 0.003 0.002 0.004* 0.001 
 (0.910) (0.083) (0.222) (0.221) (0.053) (0.541) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 0.039 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.164)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 0.178** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.014)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 0.264*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.173** --- --- 
    (0.025)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.192*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 0.165*** 
      (0.006) 
Credit×PolS 0.00004 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.961)      
Credit× VA --- -0.007*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Credit× GE --- --- -0.004*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Credit× RQ --- --- --- 0.001 --- --- 
    (0.136)   
Credit× RL --- --- --- --- -0.003*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Credit× CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.006*** 
      (0.000) 
Mobile Phone Penetration -0.0001 -0.00003 0.0005 -0.001* 0.00008 0.001*** 
 (0.631) (0.952) (0.411) (0.099) (0.861) (0.006) 
Remittances 0.001 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.003 0.008*** 0.023*** 
 (0.377) (0.000) (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na 0.031 0.180 na 0.129 0.039 
       
AR(1) (0.086) (0.068) (0.076) (0.084) (0.078) (0.073) 
AR(2) (0.446) (0.438) (0.439) (0.455) (0.438) (0.409) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.003) (0.089) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
Hansen OIR (0.628) (0.310) (0.286) (0.338) (0.402) (0.422) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.066) (0.661) (0.229) (0.275) (0.381) (0.169) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.951) (0.209) (0.352) (0.384) (0.396) (0.590) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.193) (0.343) (0.394) (0.168) (0.286) (0.245) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.888) (0.318) (0.257) (0.553) (0.490) (0.565) 
       
Fisher  228120*** 35913.95*** 334766.51*** 18283.99*** 33379.63*** 29632.82*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations  250 250 250 250 250 250 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913.na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. Values in brackets 
are p-values.  
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Table 2: Governance, Financial Access and Non-Life Insurance  (GMM 2) 
       
 Dependent variable: Non-Life Insurance (NLifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
NLifeI (-1) 0.755*** 0.643*** 0.696*** 0.788*** 0.808*** 0.663*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) 0.001 0.0002 0.0002 0.001* -0.0002 0.0005 
 (0.178) (0.800) (0.773) (0.055) (0.572) (0.416) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 0.117*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 0.175*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.004)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 0.137*** --- --- --- 
   (0.005)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.140*** --- --- 
    (0.006)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.137*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 0.146*** 
      (0.002) 
Credit×PolS -0.002*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Credit× VA --- -0.001 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.100)     
Credit× GE --- --- -0.001** --- --- --- 
   (0.034)    
Credit× RQ --- --- --- -0.001*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Credit× RL --- --- --- --- -0.0007 --- 
     (0.172)  
Credit× CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.001* 
      (0.063) 
Mobile Phone Penetration -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0006** -0.0003 
 (0.279) (0.295) (0.551) (0.135) (0.033) (0.385) 
Remittances 0.009*** 0.006 0.013* 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.012** 
 (0.000) (0.311) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  0.075 na 0.116 0.119 na 0.125 
       
AR(1) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.244) (0.146) (0.132) (0.145) (0.146) (0.137) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.263) (0.253) (0.133) (0.422) (0.301) (0.212) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.095) (0.229) (0.130) (0.280) (0.156) (0.120) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.487) (0.310) (0.218 (0.482) (0.445) (0.359) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.488) (0.102) (0.056) (0.090) (0.225) (0.136) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.190) (0.545) (0.427) (0.846) (0.414) (0.392) 
       
Fisher  711.86*** 2913.06*** 4198.79*** 9816.76*** 9694.06*** 10636.50*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  36 36 36 36 36 36 
Observations  270 270 270 270 270 270 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913.na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. Values in brackets 
are p-values.  
 
 
It is worthwhile to articulate that the insignificance of political stability in the first 
column of Table 1 may be traceable to outliers, given that four observations from the dataset 
slightly exceed the maximum negative limit of -2.5. These outlier observations are Burundi in 
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2004 and 2007 and Sudan in 2009 and 2011. However, after removing these outliers, the 
result of political stability remained insignificant.   
 
4.2 Robustness checks with a change in the conditioning information set  
In this section, we assess whether the established findings in the previous section 
withstand empirical scrutiny by involving per capita income in the conditioning information 
set. The choice of this alternative control variable is consistent with the insurance literature 
documented in Section 2 which maintains that there are significant correlations between 
income levels, economic growth and insurance penetration. Given that not more than two 
variables can be involved in the conditioning information set in order to curtail concerns 
pertaining to instrument proliferation that substantially bias estimated coefficients, the mobile 
phone penetration variable is replaced with the GDP per capita growth variable. The overall 
incidence of financial access in modulating governance dynamics for insurance development 
is assessed from net effects as in Tables 1-2. While Table 3 focuses on nexuses between 
governance, finance and life insurance penetration, Table 4 is concerned with linkages 
between governance, finance and non-life insurance penetration. It is apparent from Table 3 
that financial access significantly modulates most governance dynamics from an overall 
positive incidence on life insurance, namely:  political stability, “voice & accountability”, 
government effectiveness and the rule of law. From the findings in Table 4, the following 
governance mechanisms are modulated by financial access to induce a positive effect on life 
insurance, namely: political stability, “voice & accountability”, regulation quality and rule of 
law.  
When the findings in Tables 1-4 are compared and contrasted, financial access 
significantly modulates governance dynamics to positively affect both life insurance and non-
life insurance with one exception: only regulation quality is not significantly modulated by 
financial access to positively influence life insurance. The negative effect of GDP per capita 
in Table 3 can be traceable exclusive growth in Africa. Accordingly, despite the recent growth 
resurgence experienced by most countries in SSA, there are still growing levels of inequality 
which reflect the fact that the fruits of economic growth have not been equitably distributed 
across the population (Tchamyou et al., 2019). Hence, growth in income levels is skewed in 
favour of the wealthy fractions of society.  
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Table 3: Governance, Finance and Life Insurance   (GMM 3) 
       
 Dependent variable: Life Insurance (LifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
LifeI (-1) 0.992*** 0.757*** 0.766*** 0.711*** 0.762*** 0.646*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) 0.002* 0.011***  0.008*** 0.011** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
 (0.098) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 0.113*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 0.528*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 0.282*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.501*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.391*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 0.345*** 
      (0.004) 
Credit × PolS -0.005*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Credit × VA --- -0.017*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Credit × GE --- --- -0.005*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Credit × RQ --- --- --- -0.005*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Credit × RL --- --- --- --- -0.007*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Credit × CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.014*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth -0.003** -0.008** -0.0002 0.001 -0.003 -0.006*** 
 (0.015) (0.033) (0.914) (0.673) (0.196) (0.005) 
Remittances 0.0007 0.030*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.015*** 0.034*** 
 (0.668) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  0.008 0.172 0.177 nsa 0.396 nsa 
       
AR(1) (0.163) (0.143) (0.168) (0.167) (0.173) (0.162) 
AR(2) (0.507) (0.583) (0.492) (0.482) (0.481) (0.424) 
Sargan OIR (0.002) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.435) (0.316) (0.189) (0.075) (0.103) (0.089) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.128) (0.247) (0.216) (0.101) (0.311) (0.137) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.667) (0.378) (0.236) (0.142) (0.098) (0.141) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.153) (0.708) (0.470) (0.252) (0.337) (0.340) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.725) (0.163) (0.129) (0.076) (0.085) (0.070) 
       
Fisher  25584.67*** 22950.72*** 16816.89*** 10384.24*** 5724.60*** 11122.30*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations  252 252 252 252 252 252 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. nsa: not specifically applicable because the estimated model 
is not valid.  Constants are included in all regressions. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Values in brackets are p-values. 
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Table 4: Governance, Finance and Non-Life Insurance (GMM 4) 
       
 Dependent variable: Non-Life Insurance (NLifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
NLifeI (-1) 0.714*** 0.432*** 0.507*** 0.766*** 0.753*** 0.645*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.0006 0.001** 0.0008 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.021) (0.572) (0.016) (0.390) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 0.128*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 0.449*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 0.343*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.331*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.160*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 0.245*** 
      (0.000) 
Credit × PolS -0.004*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Credit × VA --- -0.010*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Credit × GE --- --- -0.004*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Credit × RQ --- --- --- -0.003*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Credit × RL --- --- --- --- -0.003*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Credit × CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.005*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP per capita growth -0.001 -0.003 -0.0009 -0.002 0.0003 -0.001 
 (0.607) (0.262) (0.709) (0.338) (0.874) (0.469) 
Remittances 0.008*** 0.005 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.023*** 
 (0.008) (0.347) (0.004) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  0.044 0.239 nsa 0.268 0.097 nsa 
       
AR(1) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.212) (0.196) (0.080) (0.120) (0.150) (0.106) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.233) (0.171) (0.039) (0.114) (0.198) (0.084) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.135) (0.241) (0.116) (0.268) (0.436) (0.100) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.371) (0.199) (0.067) (0.120) (0.162) (0.161) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.260) (0.455) (0.098) (0.521) (0.061) (0.110) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.280) (0.117) (0.083) (0.060) (0.571) (0.174) 
       
Fisher  3185.46*** 98.81*** 4661.50*** 1787.19*** 4325.16*** 7335.08*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Observations  272 272 272 272 272 272 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. nsa: not specifically applicable because the estimated model 
is not valid. Constants are included in all regressions. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Values in brackets are p-values. 
 
 
4.3 Robustness checks with an alternative estimation technique  
Consistent with Bogliacino, Pivaand Vivarelli (2012), the adopted GMM-estimation can 
poorly perform when a panel is characterised by a small number of cross sections. This 
research, therefore, employs an alternative estimation technique that can address the issues 
20 
 
associated with small cross sections in dynamic panel regression based on unbalanced data, 
notably: the Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDVC) estimator (Kiviet, 1995; 
Judson &Owen, 1999;  Bun & Kiviet, 2001, 2003). 
 The LSDVC methodology is appropriate when outcome variables are persistent, as 
observed in the methodology section of this research on the one hand and on the other,  builds 
on recursive correction of the bias of the fixed effects estimator (Bogliacino et al., 2012). 
According, the LSDVC methodology has been extended to unbalanced panels by Bruno 
(2005a, 2005b) because the author has improved the original Least Squares Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) estimator to an LSDVC estimator. Accordingly, the LSDVC is appropriate for this 
research because the number of cross sections is not large and the dataset is unbalanced  
 
Table 5: Governance, Finance and Life Insurance   (LSDVC1) 
       
 Dependent variable: Life Insurance (LifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice 
&Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
       
LifeI (-1) 0.246*** 0.270*** 0.238*** 0.259*** 0.267*** 0.264*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) -0.030 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.656)      
Voice &Accountability (VA) --- 0.062 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.628)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 0.027 --- --- --- 
   (0.849)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.060 --- --- 
    (0.723)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- -0.090 --- 
     (0.537)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 0.113 
      (0.364) 
Credit × PolS 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.311)      
Credit × VA --- -0.002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.395)     
Credit × GE --- --- 0.005* --- --- --- 
   (0.084)    
Credit × RQ --- --- --- -0.0002 --- --- 
    (0.908)   
Credit × RL --- --- --- --- 0.004 --- 
     (0.208)  
Credit × CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.008*** 
      (0.008) 
Mobile Phone Penetration -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0006 
 (0.365) (0.409) (0.363) (0.336) (0.268) (0.623) 
Remittances -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.913) (0.704) (0.895) (0.784) (0.834) (0.449) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na na na na na na 
       
Observations  211 211 211 211 211 211 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913. na: not applicable because at 
least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. Values in 
brackets are p-values. 
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Table 6: Governance, Finance and Non-Life Insurance   (LSDVC 2) 
       
 Dependent variable: Non-Life Insurance (NLifeI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
       
NLifeI (-1) 0.466*** 0.451*** 0.454*** 0.455*** 0.440*** 0.452*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit (Credit) 0.003* 0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.086) (0.032) (0.095) (0.100) (0.139) (0.104) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 0.030 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.379)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 0.081 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.198)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- -0.004 --- --- --- 
   (0.953)    
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- 0.090 --- --- 
    (0.270)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 0.035 --- 
     (0.627)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- -0.0005 
      (0.993) 
Credit × PolS -0.002** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.018)      
Credit × VA --- -0.004** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.014)     
Credit × GE --- --- -0.003** --- --- --- 
   (0.045)    
Credit × RQ --- --- --- -0.002* --- --- 
    (0.060)   
Credit × RL --- --- --- --- -0.003 --- 
     (0.037)  
Credit × CC --- --- --- --- --- -0.003** 
      (0.037) 
Mobile Phone Penetration -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (0.446) (0.689) (0.460) (0.477) (0.559) (0.740) 
Remittances 0.008** 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.008** 
 (0.046) (0.029) (0.020) (0.013) (0.025) (0.034) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na na na na na na 
       
Observations  230 230 230 230 230 230 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The mean of private domestic credit is 20.913. na: not applicable because at 
least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. Values in 
brackets are p-values. 
 
Unfortunately, as apparent in the findings of Tables 5-6, within the LSDVC 
framework, significant net effects are not apparent even when: (i) GDP per capita growth and 
remittances are considered as control variables such as in Tables 3-4 and (ii) mobile phone 
penetration; GDP per capita growth and remittances are involved in the conditioning 
information set.    
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 This study has investigated the role of access to credit in moderating the effect of good 
governance on insurance consumption in 42 Sub-Saharan African countries using data for the 
period 2004-2014. Two life insurance indicators are used, notably: life insurance and non-life 
insurance. All six governance dynamics from World Governance Indicators of the World 
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Bank are also used, namely:  political governance (i.e. political stability and “voice 
&accountability”), economic governance (i.e. government effectiveness and regulation 
quality) and institutional governance (i.e. corruption-control and the rule of law). The 
empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments. The following main 
findings are established. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) and Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDVC) estimators. 
Estimations from the LSDVC are not significant while the following main findings are 
established from the GMM. First, financial access promotes life insurance through channels 
of political stability, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, the rule of law and 
corruption-control. Second, financial access also stimulates non-life insurance via governance 
mechanisms of political stability, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, 
regulation quality, the rule of law and corruption-control.   
The findings broadly show that policies should be designed with the understanding 
that increasing insurance consumption is an additional benefit from improving governance 
standards and access to finance. Hence, the main policy implication is that governments of 
sampled countries should continue to implement measures that are designed to improve both 
governance standards and access to finance given that increasing insurance consumption is an 
associated benefit from enhancing standards of governance and financial access. This is 
essentially because financial access promotes the insurance industry when: (i) the election and 
replacement of political leaders is  smooth and accompanied with stability, non-violence and 
accountability (representing political governance); (ii) conducive policies are formulated and 
implemented for the delivery of public commodities and private sector development which 
includes the insurance sector (denoting economic governance) and (iii) the State and citizens 
respect institutions that govern interactions between them, which affect the doing business 
environment (reflecting institutional governance).  
After comparing the magnitude of net effects across specifications: (i) financial access 
can more effectively modulate governance to positively affect life insurance through the 
mechanisms of government effectiveness and the rule of law and (ii) financial access can 
most (least) effectively moderate governance to induce positive effects on non-life insurance 
via regulation quality (political stability). On the one hand, the relevance of government 
effectiveness and rule of law show how economic governance and institutional governance 
are fundamental in promoting life insurance in Africa. On the other hand, while the 
comparative importance of economic governance is further confirmed for the promotion of 
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non-life insurance (i.e. in the perspective of regulation quality), the fact that political stability 
is the least effective channel is intuitive and logical. Accordingly, in the absence of violence 
and political instability, incentives for insurance subscription may decrease because of a 
promising political and socio-economic outlook.   
Future studies can be devoted to assessing whether the established findings withstand 
empirical scrutiny from country-specific frameworks. Such idiosyncratic frameworks are 
relevant for more targeted policy implications. Moreover, given that the conception of 
governance in this study is based on aggregated macroeconomic observations, it will also be 
worthwhile to extend the analysis with an assessment of how corporate governance practices 
affect the insurance industry of sampled countries. Another caveat of the study is that the 
findings can be situated between correlations and causality. Hence, as more data become 
available, it would be worthwhile for future studies to employ alternative estimation 
techniques from which findings that are assimilated to causality can be established.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
Life Insurance  LifeIns Life Insurance Premium Volume to GDP (%) FDSD 
    
Non-Life Insurance  NonLifeIns Non-life Insurance Premium Volume to GDP (%) FDSD 
    
Financial  Credit Credit   Privates Domestic Credits (% of GDP) FDSD 
    
Political Stability  PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism” 
WGI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a 
free media” 
 
WGI 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”. 
 
 
WGI 
    
 
Regulation Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development”. 
 
WGI 
    
 
Corruption-Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests” 
 
WGI 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
 
WGI 
    
Mobile Phones  Mobile  Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
  
 
 
Remittances Remit Remittance inflows to GDP (%) WDI 
  
 
 
GDP per capita  GDPpcg GDP per capita growth (% of annual) WDI 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators of the World Bank. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database of the World Bank. WGI: World Governance Indicators of the World Bank.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2004-2014) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Life Insurance  0.798 1.978 0.0006 12.220 405 
Non-Life Insurance  0.799 0.531 0.005 2.774 428 
Private Domestic Credit  20.913 24.628 0.873 150.209 440 
Political Stability  -0.490 0.867 -2.687 1.182 528 
Voice & Accountability -0.509 0.683 -1.780 0.970 462 
Government Effectiveness -0.711 0.599 -1.867 1.035 462 
Regulation Quality -0.608 0.529 -1.879 1.123 462 
Corruption-Control -0.577 0.590 -1.513 1.139 462 
Rule of Law -0.651 0.604 -1.816 1.007 462 
Mobile Phone Penetration 48.455 38.082 0.209 171.375 524 
Remittances  4.313 6.817 0.00003 50.818 416 
GDP per capita growth  2.680 4.243 -37.925 30.342 462 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniformsample size: 285) 
             
Credit PolS VA GE RQ CC RL Mobile Remit GDPpcg LifeIns NonLifeIns  
1.000 0.242 0.302 0.136 0.219 0.197 0.239 0.190 -0.071 0.165 0.853 0.772 Credit 
 1.000 0.754 0.660 0.584 0.747 0.763 0.268 0.034 0.092 0.227 0.323 PolS 
  1.000 0.836 0.789 0.806 0.855 0.391 0.086 0.109 0.207 0.293 VA 
   1.000 0.878 0.872 0.907 0.460 -0.031 0.141 0.106 0.190 GE 
    1.000 0.769 0.836 0.446 -0.088 0.041 0.165 0.250 RQ 
     1.000 0.910 0.413 0.107 0.099 0.159 0.273 CC 
      1.000 0.404 0.045 0.120 0.166 0.289 RL 
       1.000 -0.075 -0.025 0.131 0.070 Mobile 
        1.000 -0.012 -0.001 0.412 Remit 
         1.000 0.160 0.179 GDPpcg 
          1.000 0.790 LifeIns 
           1.000 NonLifeIns 
             
Mobile: Mobile phone penetration. Internet: Internet penetration. BroadB: Fixed  broadband subscriptions. PolS: Political 
Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. 
RL: Rule of Law. Mobile: Mobile Phone Penetration. Remit: Remittances. GDPcpg: Gross Domestic Product per capita 
growth. LifeIns: Life Insurance. NonLifeIns: Non-Life Insurance.  
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